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ABSTRACT 
Thinking about past and future experiences is a fundamental component of mental and 
social life. My goal is to explore asymmetries in how people’s perceptions of the future 
uniquely differ from perceptions of similar experiences in the past and present. A large 
literature suggests that people are pervasively optimistic about the future, believing their 
lives are headed in an increasingly positive direction. I seek to examine how such beliefs 
come to be maintained and reinforced. Two particular “strategies” are highlighted, the 
evidence for which is drawn from 11 studies across 2 empirical papers. First, I show that 
people simply discount cues that forewarn of negative events in their futures, stubbornly 
believing that those events will not actually occur (“Easy to Retrieve but Hard to Believe: 
Metacognitive Discounting of the Unpleasantly Possible: O’Brien, 2013). Second, I show 
that people perceive their future selves as possessing superior mental capacities compared 
to their past and present selves; hence, even if bad events were to happen, people believe 
their future selves will be better equipped to handle them (“Emotional Pasts and Rational 
Futures: The Mind Perception of Self Over Time”: O’Brien, 2014). Taken together, these 
findings reveal that people are persistently optimistic by reinforcing their perceptions of a 
positive future across two routes: in how they perceive the likelihood of external events, 
and in how they perceive changes in their own internal abilities. This observation helps 
integrate the existing literature on optimism by making predictions about when a positive 
future should signify an advantageous boon versus a problematic bias. And more broadly, 
my dissertation seeks to highlight time as a central construct of social psychology study.
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CHAPTER I 
Time in the Mind 
 
“Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the 
instant of becoming…In short, [it] is no knife-edge but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth 
of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions…” 
 
— William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890, Ch. XV, p. 608) 
 
It is difficult to imagine a mental system that cannot process time. Our sense of 
duration helps us plan and prepare; our sense of sequence instills order and meaning; and 
our sense of change impels us toward growth, progress, and fulfillment. And yet, with so 
many temporal components at work, our actual experience of time eludes us. Moments 
come and go, their tangible reality ever fleeting, and we are left with little beyond a 
psychological present that “barely has time to exist” (Kahneman & Riis, 2005, p. 285). 
The real importance of time to social psychology, then, may depend less on its in situ 
phenomenology and more on how people think about temporal life at a distance. 
As James notes in the opening quote above, one fundamental way in which people 
think about time is in terms of tense: if the present swiftly expires, then what endures are 
perceptions of moments once felt and of those still to come. James’ “two directions” thus 
comprise the focus of my dissertation, and in particular the differences that can emerge 
when people think about a given experience as it already occurred in their pasts versus 
how they believe it might unfold in their futures. My central thesis is that perceptions of
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the future are perpetually more positive than perceptions of the past and present, even 
when there is reason to believe otherwise. I seek to demonstrate specifically how these 
optimistic beliefs come to be maintained and reinforced. First, I show that people simply 
discount cues that forewarn of negative events in the future, stubbornly believing those 
events will not actually occur. Second, I show that people perceive their future selves as 
possessing superior mental capacities as compared to their past and present selves; hence, 
even if bad events were to take place, people believe that their future selves will be better 
equipped to handle them. Ultimately, I argue that people are persistently optimistic by 
actively reinforcing a positive future in at least two distinct ways: in how they (i) predict 
the probability of external events, and (ii) perceive changes in their own internal states. 
I begin by outlining the literature on “temporal asymmetries,” a growing body of 
work that highlights general differences in how people mentally represent the same event 
at equidistant points in the past versus in the future. I then focus more specifically on one 
pervasive difference—the future’s strong association with positive change—and discuss 
relevant findings in the optimism literature since Weinstein’s (1980) foundational studies 
on how people estimate their own versus others’ likelihood of encountering good and bad 
life outcomes. Next, I describe how my own findings can help integrate and supplement 
this work, and provide evidence across 11 studies from 2 empirical papers. Finally, I end 
by proposing unexplored research questions that might further advance the topic at hand. 
Despite James’ discerning words from nearly 130 years ago, social psychology is 
only beginning to consider time as a central construct of study. I hope this dissertation 
helps shed light on the dynamic impact of temporal forces in social and mental life, and 




One of the more prominent social psychological frameworks in recent years is 
known as construal level theory (for a thorough review see Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
The basic proposition is that people process events differently depending on whether 
those events feel close to or far from current experience. Just as physical objects appear 
blurrier to our visual system the farther away they withdraw into space, construal level 
theory proposes that our mental representations lose detail the farther away they “feel” 
from us, and hence are processed on more abstract (versus concrete) dimensions. This 
effect has been demonstrated across a wide array of domains. In terms of social distance, 
for example, people tend to judge distant strangers according to abstract, bigger picture 
principles that are ‘hard to see’ (“Why did she get the job?”), whereas close friends are 
judged more according to ‘easy to see’ concrete details (“What did she wear to work?”: 
Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Most relevant for current purposes, construal level 
theory has also been applied to temporal distance: people tend to place a greater emphasis 
on abstract qualities when imagining events that are far away in time (“Will next year’s 
vacation be fun?”), but on concrete qualities when imagining events that are close in time 
(“Will tomorrow’s vacation be feasible?”: Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). 
Importantly, although this temporal construal framework has certainly helped 
integrate and advance a number of social psychological findings, it has been relatively 
silent about the potential role of tense. In other words, the theory assumes that the effect 
of “distance from now” is symmetric: people should process an event that is 1 year into 
the past in the same way as they would if the event were 1 year into the future, because 
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distance is held constant and thus their levels of abstraction are comparable. A growing 
body of work, however, has begun to uncover qualitative differences in how people think 
about past versus future events across an equidistant point in time, findings that have 
been termed “temporal asymmetries.” These asymmetries manifest in many forms. 
For example, the popular metaphor of “time flies like an arrow” in Western 
thought invokes a spatial asymmetry: the past is mentally represented on the left side of 
space and feels like it is “behind” us, whereas we move “ahead” towards a future that is 
represented on the right side of space (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002). Further, people 
actually lean their bodies forwards and to the right when thinking about the future, but 
backwards and to the left when thinking about the past (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2010). 
People tend to view their future selves from a third-person perspective but their past 
selves from a first-person perspective (Pronin & Ross, 2006); and the future more 
generally feels closer to the present at a subjective level (Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & 
Ward, 2013), evokes more arousal (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007), and feels more 
intentional (Burns, Caruso, & Bartels, 2011) and important (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson) 
than thinking about similar events at an equidistant point in the past (see Van Boven, 
Kane, & McGraw, 2009 for a comprehensive review). 
Clearly, then, thinking about the same event at a past, present, or future point can 
generate critical differences on various evaluative, emotional, and behavioral outcomes. 
Tense matters; 1 year into the past is not the same as 1 year into the future, even though 
objective distance and content are held constant. Next, I narrow my focus on perhaps the 
most pervasive and well-documented difference across tense: asymmetries in valence. 
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Changing for the Better 
The Beatles once famously admitted that “it’s getting better all the time.” Diverse 
empirical evidence confirms this familiar everyday experience: despite current conditions 
or whatever we have endured in the past, people cling to the idea that tomorrow promises 
greener pastures and sunnier circumstances, representing a robust temporal asymmetry. 
Most people construct idealized versions of their futures (Higgins, 1987), which 
helps maintain self-esteem (Maslow, 1970), foster confidence (Sedikides & Skowronski, 
2000), and subdue negative moods (Taylor & Brown, 1988), as well as motivate present 
action and goal-pursuit (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). The very 
narratives on which we rely to summarize and make sense of daily life are imbued with 
optimism: people generally believe their lives move towards something, that they learn 
and grow wiser over time (see Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; 
McAdams, 2006; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). When people are asked to directly reflect 
on how they have changed in recent years, they tend to denigrate past selves in ways that 
bolster the present and future (e.g., “I used to lack brains, but now I’m much smarter and 
headed in the right direction”)—even if this criticism is unwarranted (e.g., when past and 
present intelligence scores do not objectively differ: Ross, 1989; Wilson & Ross, 2001). 
In one especially influential demonstration that epitomizes optimism’s pervasive 
impact on perception and judgment, Weinstein (1980) asked college students to estimate 
their chances of experiencing various life events throughout adulthood. Participants also 
estimated the likelihood that other students from their university would encounter the 
same events within the same period. The results were clear. For nearly every desirable 
possibility (e.g., attaining a well-paying job, owning a home, living past 80 years old), 
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participants vastly overestimated their own chances compared to the chances of similar 
others, and also compared to base rates of objective likelihood. In contrast, for nearly 
every undesirable possibility (e.g., developing a drinking problem, having a heart attack, 
getting divorced), participants underestimated their own chances compared to others and 
also to base rates. People thus believe that their own futures will be uniquely bright. This 
claim has been further corroborated across numerous populations, settings, and measures 
(see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Schachter & Addis, 2007; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). 
 
The Persistence of Optimism? 
In the past 30 or so years since Weinstein’s (1980) seminal findings, research into 
optimism has largely fallen into 1 of 2 camps. On the one hand, researchers have sought 
to uncover positive benefits of perceiving a positive future, and to establish optimism as 
an advantageous tendency. Taylor and Brown (1988) famously argued that optimism is a 
key harbinger of health benefits, from enhancing mood and self-esteem, to strengthening 
coping abilities, to improving social relationships and professional productivity. Their 
more intriguing claim, however, was that such benefits should be gained even when 
optimistic beliefs are exaggerated, false, or unfounded, and in fact that “accurate self-
knowledge may be negatively related to psychological health” (p. 197, italics added). 
More recently, Seligman (1998, 2008) and others in the positive psychology movement 
have sought to extend this notion to physiological outcomes, maintaining that optimism 
can help protect against stroke (Kim, Park, & Peterson, 2011), coronary heart disease 
(Kubzansky, 2001), and even death (Maruta, Colligan, Malinchoc, & Offord, 2000). 
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On the other hand, a different group of researchers has sought to establish 
optimism as a disadvantageous tendency, and to highlight its undermining impact on 
judgment accuracy. From this perspective, perceiving the future as overly positive is 
viewed as a bias with detrimental consequences. For example, the planning fallacy 
describes the systematic tendency for people to underestimate how much time they will 
need to successfully complete a task (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This misperception  
is thought to be driven by the optimistic belief that one’s future will be successful even 
with poor planning in the past (Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001), and that others are less 
fit to complete the task than oneself (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002). More generally, 
overestimating one’s own skills compared to peers can lead people to pursue certain 
goals or tasks on which they will not actually be able to succeed (Moore & Healy, 2008). 
And of course, believing that others are more at risk of aversive life circumstances than 
oneself can discourage people from seeking out preventative treatments; changing one’s 
current eating or buying habits seems unnecessary if future health or financial problems 
seem unlikely (Weinstein & Klein, 1995). Many such arguments are summarized in a 
recent popular press book, the title of which succinctly captures this camp’s viewpoint: 
“The Optimism Bias: A Tour of the Irrationally Positive Brain” (Sharot, 2012). 
In this dissertation, my goal is to take a more impartial perspective on the role of 
optimism in everyday experience. Rather than trying to argue for benefits versus biases, 
these disparate literatures might benefit from a broader analysis of how such beliefs come 
to be initially maintained and reinforced. In other words, understanding how optimism 
persists—how people perpetuate their positive beliefs about the future despite learning 
information that suggests otherwise (e.g., base rates, past failures, others’ success)—
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might help integrate the two perspectives, in pointing to different situations for when it 
may help and when it may backfire. Indeed, like most psychological constructs, optimism 
is likely not entirely beneficial or detrimental. Hence, I hope to shed more basic light on 
how and when optimistic beliefs exactly “stick,” so as to help disentangle the contexts in 
which the asymmetry should serve as something to embrace versus something to contain. 
 
Preview of Empirical Evidence 
The approach of this dissertation is to highlight basic ways in which people 
reinforce their positive perceptions of the future. Two particular ‘routes’ are proposed, 
which are drawn from the results of 11 experiments across 2 original empirical papers. 
The first route is external, in that it examines how people estimate the likelihood 
of good and bad events. I begin with a brief literature review specific to the hypothesis, 
which will test whether people optimistically ignore feelings of fluency when thinking 
about bad events (i.e., easily and clearly imagining them), which allows people to be 
untroubled by the prospect of an unpleasant future. I then describe 5 studies that provide 
supportive evidence. The first 2 studies establish the effect by asking participants to think 
about good and bad events that either occurred during the preceding year or that might 
occur during the following year. In this way, I show that the pattern is specific to people’s 
perceptions of the future, and does not reflect an effect of time or distance more broadly. 
The final studies further confirm that the pattern generalizes across multiple measures 
(Study 3), does not generalize to estimates of peers (Study 4), and is indeed driven by 
perceived likelihood (Study 5)—all in line with standard accounts of optimism. Thus, 
positive futures persist because people discount cues that forewarn of negative events. 
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The second route is internal, in that it examines how people optimistically 
perceive changes over time in their own mental states. After a brief review of research 
into how people think about identity, development, and change, I provide evidence from 
6 studies demonstrating that people perceive their future selves as possessing superior 
mental capacities (e.g., self-control, rational thought) as compared to their past and 
present selves; hence, even if bad events were to occur, people believe that their future 
selves will be better equipped to handle them. The first 3 studies establish this effect at 
the self-report level by asking participants to describe their past and future abilities via 
open-ended essays (Study 1) and on fixed scales (Studies 2-3). As also shown in the 
“internal” studies above, I then confirm that the pattern is specific to thinking about the 
self and does not emerge when people think about change in peers (Study 4). The final 
studies highlight consequences for judgment and behavior in the present (Studies 5-6). 
Throughout this dissertation, each chapter that corresponds to the internal and 
external routes ends by outlining direct follow-up studies for future work. In the chapter 
that follows, I more generally discuss how the findings fit in and add to the existing state 
of optimism research, and how they can help make predictions about when perceiving a 
positive future should help versus hurt. Finally, I return to James and use my work as a 
springboard from which to promote time as a core construct in mental and social life.
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CHAPTER II 
Evidence from the Perception of External Events 
 
This chapter is adapted from my original paper “Easy to Retrieve but Hard to 
Believe: Metacognitive Discounting of the Unpleasantly Possible” (O’Brien, 2013): 
How happy were you last year? How much happiness might next year bring? 
Such questions invite people to recall or imagine events in their lives that contain joy and 
pleasure, sorrow and sadness. Traditional theories of evaluative judgment (e.g., Higgins, 
1996; Wyer & Srull, 1989) assume that people who generate many thoughts of positive 
events should feel happier than those who generate few, and people who generate many 
thoughts of negative events should feel unhappier than those who generate few. However, 
thinking about one’s life not only involves thought content but also the phenomenological 
experience of bringing thoughts to mind, in particular how easily they are processed and 
retrieved. Accordingly, people’s metacognitive experience of ease (“fluency”) may lead 
them to perceive more or less happiness when pleasant and unpleasant moments feel easy 
to imagine (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
Winkielman & Schwarz, 2001). For example, if negative events from last year come 
easily to mind, people could infer that they must not have been very happy after all—
even if, paradoxically, they recall only a handful of unpleasant memories. 
At the same time, although the past is affectively mixed such that both good and 
bad events are easily accessible (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003), our expectations about the
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future tend to be far less diluted by negative thoughts. Rather, most of us are pervasively 
optimistic that things will go right, that tomorrow promises greener pastures and sunnier 
circumstances (e.g., see Schacter & Addis, 2007; Sharot, 2012; Weinstein, 1980). In its 
extreme form, this bias can of course lead to problematic misperceptions of one’s own 
skill and status (Moore & Healy, 2008). In general, however, people’s natural tendencies 
to assume positive, desirable, and successful outcomes prove quite useful for navigating 
everyday life—whether by helping us literally get out of bed (“Will I safely arrive at the 
office?”) or inspiring us toward broader goals (“Will my effort pay off down the road?”). 
For these reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that perceptions of the future tend to 
be dominated by pleasant (versus unpleasant) expectations; our normative orientation is 
to assume positive outcomes unless we find reason to believe otherwise (e.g., Chambers 
& Windschitl, 2004; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Two pilot surveys 
confirmed this view (participants in these two surveys and in all studies that follow were 
recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; recruitment is not discussed further). 
In the first survey, 50 online participants (Mage = 34.36; 40% women) were asked 
to rate what percentage of their thoughts on an average day contain positive, negative, 
and neutral content. As predicted, participants reported that they thought about positive 
content far more frequently (M = 43.80%) than negative (M = 27.02%) or neutral (M = 
29.18%) content. Moreover, they explicitly described their future-oriented thoughts by 
choosing whether they tend to “assume most things will go right” or “assume most things 
will go wrong” in their lives. A majority (74%) expected their futures to go well. 
The second survey expanded upon this observation by recruiting a new sample of 
50 participants (Mage = 27.50; 30% women) to specifically forecast if their lives next year 
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would contain (A) only positive events, (B) mostly positive events and some negative 
events, (C) equal occurrences of positive and negative events, (D) mostly negative events 
and some positive events, or (E) only negative events. As expected, most (60%) chose B. 
In a similar vein, when these participants were asked to choose whether they were more 
focused on “attaining happy moments” or “avoiding unhappy moments” next year, most 
(88%) chose the former. Together, these pilot data confirm that people tend to think about 
their future lives in positive terms: most of us expect things to go well (not poorly), and 
that tomorrow promises many more happy experiences than unhappy experiences. 
Thus, people hold preexisting beliefs about what their emotional futures might be 
like, in contrast to their pasts that necessarily include both good and bad moments. In 
terms of fluency, this distinction suggests that although recalling both happy and sad past 
events might be susceptible to metacognitive assimilation, an interesting valence-specific 
departure could emerge for future events once people’s initial assumptions are met with 
conflicting metacognitive cues. Namely, imagining positive futures should be susceptible 
to fluency, but its effect may be eliminated when thinking about negative futures. Indeed, 
people who struggle to generate positive forecasts may find reason to feel worse—after 
all, people are accustomed to thinking about the future in positive terms, and we naturally 
expect that many good events will occur. Hence, the salient act of trying (and failing) to 
generate pleasant possibilities might seem like a telling sign that something is “wrong.” 
Accordingly, people could infer future unhappiness in line with fluency effects. By the 
same logic, however, easily imagining negative events need not sound the alarm—after 
all, most of us rarely think about the future in negative terms, and we expect that negative 
outcomes are highly unlikely. Hence, generated images of an unhappy future could seem 
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undiagnostic or uninformative about more “realistic” future states. In line with this view, 
people may discount their metacognitive experience: they may be no more likely to infer 
future unhappiness when unpleasant futures feel easy (versus difficult) to think about. 
Five studies tested these possibilities by asking participants to generate happy or 
unhappy events from the preceding or upcoming year, and comparing ease of retrieval 
with global assessments of wellbeing. Based on previous findings, it was predicted that 
fluency would indeed influence people’s perceptions of happy pasts, happy futures, and 
unhappy pasts; however, its effect might be eliminated when imagining unhappy futures. 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 directly examined the effects of fluency on perceptions of past and future 
wellbeing via a correlational design. 
Method. In a 2 (time: past or future) x 2 (valence: happy or unhappy) between-
subjects design, 389 participants (Mage = 33.31; 72% women) were asked to generate lists 
of 8 personal experiences from “last year” or “next year” that made or would make them 
happy or unhappy. In this and all studies, participants were recruited near the middle of 
the calendar year, which accounts for the possibility that “last year” was at a farther or 
closer distance than “next year.” Then, participants rated how difficult the experiences 
were to generate and how happy they were or would be overall (1 = not at all, 10 = very). 
Results. Data were submitted to bivariate correlational analyses. Consistent with 
fluency effects, the easier it was to generate positive past experiences, the happier people 
thought they used to be, r = -.49, p < .001, and the easier it was to generate negative past 
experiences, the unhappier people thought they used to be, r = .36, p = .001. But this was 
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not the case for future events, marking the critical departure. The easier it was to generate 
positive future experiences, the happier people thought they would be, r = -.26, p = .009, 
as expected. However, there was no relationship between easily imagining negative 
futures and overall judgments of future emotional states, r = -.07, p = .52. These findings 
provide support for the hypothesis: global perceptions of past and future happiness were 
strongly associated with the ease of retrieving good and bad events—except when people 
tried to imagine unhappy futures. 
 
Study 2 
Study 2 sought to replicate the patterns observed in the prior study in a fully-
randomized experiment by manipulating fluency (adapted from Schwarz et al., 1991). 
Method. In a 2 (time: past or future) x 2 (valence: happy or unhappy) x 2 
(fluency: easy or difficult) between-subjects design, 180 participants (Mage = 32.97; 54% 
women) were asked to list either 3 (easy task) or 12 (difficult task) happy or unhappy 
personal experiences from last or next year, then answered the questions from Study 1. 
Results. Data were submitted to MANOVA analyses, with ratings of difficulty 
and overall happiness serving as dependent variables, and time, valence, and fluency 
conditions serving as the independent variables. Validating the fluency manipulation, 12 
experiences were indeed harder to generate (M = 6.14) than 3 experiences (M = 3.52), p < 
.001.  More important, global assessments were qualified by the predicted 3-way 
interaction, F(1, 179) = 3.96, p = .048 (see Figure 1). Ironically, people who recalled only 
3 positive past events remembered being happier overall (M = 7.79, SD = 1.25) than 
people who recalled 12 positive past events (M = 6.33, SD = 2.26), p = .009, but people 
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who recalled 12 negative past events remembered being happier overall (M = 7.44, SD = 
1.50) than people who recalled only 3 negative past events (M = 5.91, SD = 1.98), p = 
.01. Moreover, the same critical departure emerged: although listing 3 positive future 
events led people to imagine being happier overall (M = 8.13, SD = .85) than listing 12 
positive future events (M = 7.20, SD = 1.40), p = .01, people predicted equal happiness 
regardless of listing 3 (M = 7.11, SD = 1.85) or 12 (M = 7.13, SD = 2.11) negative future 
events, p = .97. These findings replicate those of Study 1 with a fully randomized design. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean ratings of past or future happiness as a function of condition and the 
number of events that participants were asked to generate. Conditions were defined by 
whether participants were instructed to remember or predict happy or unhappy events.  































3 events generated 12 events generated 
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Having established the general effects of fluency on people’s perceptions of 
wellbeing over time, Studies 3-5 sought to further unpack its unique (null) effect on 
future unhappiness. First, does the departure remain when using more diverse measures 
of wellbeing (Study 3)? Second, given the well-established connection between 
traditional optimism biases and motivated reasoning, does the departure contain a 
motivational component (Study 4)? Third, is the effect indeed mediated by people’s 
perceptions of how likely good and bad events are to actually occur (Study 5)? 
 
Study 3 
Studies 1-2 are restricted to a single-item measure of happiness, but many studies 
of wellbeing employ multi-dimensional measures. Study 3 sought to address this concern. 
Method. In a between-subjects correlational design, 51 participants (Mage = 29.24; 
61% women) were asked to generate lists of 8 happy or unhappy personal experiences 
that could occur next year and also rated how difficult they were to generate (1 = not at 
all, 10 = very). Participants then completed 2 wellbeing scales. First, they completed the 
5 future-related items from the well-established Temporal Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(e.g., “The conditions of my life next year will be excellent”: Pavot, Diener, & Suh, 
1998), which were rated on scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Second, participants completed 5 global assessments of future wellbeing: how happy and 
satisfied they will be next year, how much they will enjoy next year, how much fun they 
will have, and how positive they will feel, rated on scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very). 
Results. Data were submitted to bivariate correlational analyses. Items from the 
Temporal Satisfaction with Life Scale were collapsed into a composite index of 
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prospective satisfaction (α = .89), and global items were collapsed into a composite index 
of prospective happiness (α = .97). As expected, the easier it was to generate positive 
future experiences, the more satisfied (r = -.42, p = .028) and happier (r = -.51, p = .006) 
people thought they would be overall. However, as in prior studies, there was no 
relationship between easily imagining negative futures and overall predicted satisfaction 
(r = .14, p = .50) or overall predicted happiness (r = .12, p = .59). These results extend 
the patterns from Studies 1-2 beyond a single-item wellbeing measure. 
 
Study 4 
As outlined in this chapter’s introduction, most people naturally expect their 
futures to contain many more happy moments than unhappy moments. A large literature 
suggests such optimistic perceptions stem from motivated reasoning: people are biased to 
expect mostly good outcomes as a means to enhance mood, maintain self-esteem, and 
impel behavior (see Kunda, 1990; Sharot, 2012; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Accordingly, 
research shows that people only necessarily believe that their own futures will be bright 
(for a review see Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). In other words, although Studies 1-3 
suggest people discount personal negative futures, people who easily imagine someone 
else’s negative future should still be affected by fluency if, as presumed, the departure is 
rooted in these well-established optimistic expectations. Study 4 tested this possibility. 
Method. In a between-subjects correlational design, 80 participants (Mage = 
31.45; 49% women) completed a survey about how people think about their friends. On 
the opening screen, they were asked to indicate the name of a close friend whom they 
knew much about, which restricted judgments to highly familiar others (people are 
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affected by fluency differently when thinking about familiar versus unfamiliar targets: 
Caruso, 2008). Next, participants were asked to list 8 experiences that might make their 
friend happy or unhappy during the upcoming year, and rated how difficult they were to 
generate (1 = not at all, 10 = very). Then, they completed adapted versions of the 
measures used in Study 3: the Temporal Satisfaction with Life Scale (e.g., “The 
conditions of my friend’s life next year will be excellent”: α = .82) and the 5-item 
wellbeing scale (e.g., “How happy will your friend be next year?”: α = .96). 
Results. Data were submitted to bivariate correlational analyses. Again, the easier 
it was to generate positive future experiences, the more satisfied (r = -.28, p = .069) and 
happier (r = -.35, p = .021) people thought their friend would be overall. However, unlike 
previous studies, this pattern remained for negative forecasts: the easier it was to generate 
negative future experiences, the less satisfied (r = .38, p = .022) and less happy (r = .36, p 
= .03) people thought their friend would be. This finding is important for integrating 
Studies 1-3 into traditional optimism accounts. The act of imagining negative events 
itself cannot account for the null effect of fluency; rather, the target of those negative 
forecasts predicts whether fluency has an effect (generating for others) or whether it is 
discounted (generating for the self). Thus, Study 4 corroborates the proposition that this 
departure reflects people’s optimistic expectations of their own futures. The next study 
sought to establish direct evidence for this process. 
 
Study 5 
A final question pertains to specific reasons for why people discount feelings of 
fluency when generating negative (but not positive) forecasts. As proposed, the departure 
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should depend on people’s expectations that good events are much more likely to happen 
to them than bad events. Because we expect many happy events to occur, the salient act 
of struggling to imagine happy moments may decrease their perceived likelihood, leading 
to lower predicted happiness. On the other hand, easily imagining unhappy events need 
not sound the alarm if we naturally assume they are highly unlikely. Study 5 explored 
whether perceived likelihood indeed mediates the effect of fluency on global perceptions. 
Method. In a 2 (valence: positive or negative) x 2 (fluency: easy or difficult) 
between-subjects design, 196 participants were invited to take a survey about their own 
upcoming summer vacations. On the opening screen, 25 subjects admitted they had no 
vacation plans and were removed. Thus, 171 real vacationers (Mage = 29.43; 46% women) 
generated 3 or 12 “positive things that could go right” or “negative things that could go 
wrong” on their trip. As a pure manipulation check, they indicated whether this list was 
“generally difficult” or “generally easy” to fill (people with inconsistent responses were 
eliminated for a more explicit test of the hypothesis). For dependent measures, subjects 
completed the (modified) 5-item global wellbeing scale from Studies 3-4 (e.g., “How 
happy will you be on this vacation?”: α = .96), counterbalanced with the question: “What 
are the chances that many things will go right [wrong] on this vacation?” (0% to 100%). 
Results. Data were submitted to MANOVA analyses, with ratings of difficulty 
and overall happiness serving as dependent variables, and valence and fluency conditions 
serving as the independent variables. Prospective happiness was indeed qualified by the 
predicted interaction, F(1, 117) = 4.51, p = .036. People who listed only 3 positive events 
predicted that they would be happier on the vacation (M = 8.95, SD = 1.28) than those 
who listed 12 positive events (M = 8.20, SD = 1.14), p = .034. Similarly, participants 
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believed the chance that many things would go right on the vacation was less likely after 
they listed 12 positive events (M = 73.76%, SD = 14.60%) than after they listed 3 positive 
events (M = 84.54%, SD = 11.77%), p = .008. In turn, and in line with the theoretical 
framework, perceptions of the chance of good events actually occurring on vacation fully 
mediated the effect of fluency on forecasted trip wellbeing (Hayes, 2012: 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval = [-1.42, -0.22], which excludes the value 0; see also Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Multiple regression mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1986) showing the 
influence of fluency condition (easy or difficult) on forecasted happiness on vacation, as 
influenced by perceptions of how likely it was that good events would occur. The ps in 
parentheses show the strength of the path between two variables when the third variable 




Importantly, however, people expected equal happiness regardless of whether 
they listed 3 (M = 8.75, SD = 1.23) or 12 (M = 9.02, SD = 1.11) negative events, p = .42. 
Accordingly, bad vacation experiences seemed just as unlikely after participants listed 3 
negative events (M = 22.14%, SD = 16.08%) as after they listed 12 negative events (M = 
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16.50%, SD = 12.85%), p = .14. Thus, the discounting effect may be explained by a 
difference in the perception of good and bad experiences actually occurring. 
 
Chapter Discussion 
These findings appear to be clear in cause and rich in consequence. First, how 
happy people think they were or will be is strongly shaped by incidental metacognitive 
cues. Paradoxically, happiness seems to be maximized when people generate few pleasant 
memories or forecasts—not many—because struggling to generate positive moments 
leads people to infer less positive lives. This observation is critical for marketers, policy-
makers, and everyday people alike, who often endorse opposite strategies for enhancing 
wellbeing (e.g., promoting the belief that more happiness in quantity yields more 
happiness in quality: see Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007). 
Second, this effect is eliminated when imagining negative futures, because people 
expect that few negative experiences are just as unlikely to occur as many. This finding 
reveals important boundaries to the axiom that fluently-processed information represents 
“real” information, that thoughts which easily come to mind are perceived as believable, 
accurate, and true (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Brennan 
& Williams, 1995; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Hilbig, 2012; Kelley & 
Lindsay, 1993; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). People who 
easily imagined negative future experiences were no more inclined to believe that they 
would be unhappy, stubbornly insisting upon the same pleasant tomorrow as people who 
struggled to imagine negative future experiences. Thus, metacognitive states themselves 
can apparently feel “wrong”, which are not brought to bear on our subsequent judgments 
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and perceptions. These results indicate that people may “tune out” their metacognitive 
voices depending on the valence and content of their thoughts, in addition to their 
preexisting expectations, beliefs, and motives. 
Theoretical Extensions. The observation above complements past work showing 
that people are less influenced by fluency when thinking about unfamiliar others, because 
they infer that their fluent or disfluent state reflects a lack of private knowledge rather 
than something meaningful about the target (Caruso, 2008). Generally speaking, people 
might be unswayed when metacognitive feelings are perceived as undiagnostic about the 
content domain—which may help explain why fluency seems to lose its power when 
people think about unfamiliar targets and when the thinking experience itself feels 
unfamiliar or unnatural (e.g., trying to generate negative forecasts or to imagine negative 
futures rather than engaging in our normative orientation toward the positive). Ironically, 
generating downsides of an upcoming positive event could yield just as much excitement 
as generating some upsides—and more excitement than imagining many upsides. 
This valence-specific asymmetry reveals novel and nuanced phenomenology 
underlying how people think about the future. In one sense, the fluent experience of 
easily imagining negative futures could have led people to increase their estimates of the 
likelihood of bad events and thus infer future unhappiness in line with standard fluency 
effects. But this was not the case. Rather, ease of retrieval was apparently not powerful 
enough to nudge participants away from their preexisting expectations, consistent with a 
huge number of prior attempts (and subsequent failures) to change people’s pervasively 
optimistic beliefs about the unlikelihood of personally experiencing negative events (see 
Moore & Healy, 2008, for a review). Note, however, that the very nature of such biases— 
 23 
our natural orientation toward the positive and our expectation that the future promises 
many more happy experiences than unhappy experiences—may present a double-edged 
sword for maintaining rosy outlooks once we are faced with reason to believe otherwise: 
On the one hand, people expect that bad experiences are highly unlikely, which 
helps us stay hopeful in the face of unpleasant prospects. Moreover, even if participants 
were asked to think of highly probable negative events, they still might be comforted by 
their perception that most future events will nonetheless be positive. On the other hand, 
precisely because we expect that good experiences are highly likely, optimistic beliefs 
can be readily challenged by the lack of pleasant prospects. Indeed, people who struggle 
to imagine positive events seem to be left with nowhere else to turn. Paradoxically, then, 
the same beliefs and expectations that lead people to initially assume brighter tomorrows 
can serve as a metacognitive blessing when thinking about unhappy future experiences 
but a metacognitive curse when thinking about happy future experiences. 
Future Directions. This valence-driven distinction in future-oriented thinking 
may lead to important differential consequences. One avenue for follow-up research 
might explore people’s (non)-reliance on metacognitive cues for different types of 
content. Thinking about the hypothetical future is often just as constrained by reality as 
thinking about the actual past (see Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Ross & Buehler, 2004)—
in these situations, one could expect similar patterns as the current studies. However, it 
seems less intuitive to rely on metacognitive cues when sampling from a potentially 
infinite or impossible population of future experiences; although “next year” and “next 
vacation” are relatively defined and realistic, easily daydreaming about hitting game-
winning home runs should not lead people to infer that they have better chances of 
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playing professional baseball for the Philadelphia Phillies. Nonetheless, the fact that 
“happy future” participants were sensitive to metacognitive cues suggests that people can 
be influenced by fluency not only when generating “literal” thought content. 
A related avenue should extend these principles beyond the temporal domain. If a 
negative future generally represents something that people tend not to think about or do 
not naturally expect, then similarly “hard to believe” content should also be discounted. 
For example, if unfavorable reviews of a desired product or unwelcome news stories of a 
preferred political candidate come easily to mind, people might be uninfluenced their 
experience of ease and stubbornly maintain their original opinions. Future work should 
fruitfully explore this possibility, as well as its problematic implications. Indeed, in some 
situations our sense of ease probably should signal a need to adapt our opinions, choices, 
or judgments, particularly in the case of easily imagining potential problems in our lives 
(e.g., thinking about future experiences that could very well make us unhappy). 
Summary. Ultimately, the current studies help expose some of the 
phenomenological foundations underlying people’s potentially misguided thought 
processes and misperceptions of wellbeing in everyday life, and thus suggest important 
topics for research. In doing so, they shed light on and raise new questions about how 
people perceive their well-being over time. More broadly, they reveal the need for a 
better understanding of when otherwise strong subjective experiences do not influence 
judgment—perhaps when more pleasant beliefs and biases prove to be more satisfying.
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CHAPTER III 
Evidence from the Perception of Internal Change 
 
This chapter is adapted from my original paper “Emotional Pasts and Rational 
Futures: The Mind Perception of Self Over Time” (O’Brien, 2014): 
People regularly ascribe mental capacities to friends, pets, and spirits despite the 
fact that mental states beyond one’s own immediate experience cannot be seen or felt in 
any tangible sense. Others’ intentions, thoughts, and feelings are necessarily perceived, 
and people’s penchant for perceiving other minds is one of nature’s finest and most 
frequently utilized gifts (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008; Gray, Young, & 
Waytz, 2012). Less well understood, however, is how people perceive their own mental 
states beyond the here and now, namely, in the past and future. To the extent that mental 
representations of past and future selves bear resemblance to other people (Pronin & 
Ross, 2006), processes underlying mental inference across space (e.g., from me to you) 
might extend across time and tense (e.g., me 10 years ago to me now to me in 10 years). 
Building on a two-dimensional model of mind perception (Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007) that distinguishes between “experience” (e.g., emotional capacity, body 
sensitivity) versus “agency” (e.g., cognition, rationality), 6 experiments reveal that people 
indeed ascribe mental capacities to past and future selves but appear to redistribute these 
capacities over time, demonstrating a robust temporal asymmetry in perceiving one’s
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own mental states. How much emotional experience and rational agency people see in 
themselves depends on whether they are looking back to the past or ahead to the future. 
 
Perceiving Other Minds 
Social psychology enjoys a rich tradition of exploring the mental processes and 
intergroup dynamics that underlie how people interpret others’ thoughts and actions 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Swann, 1984). 
One recent instantiation of this literature has emerged under the diverse scope of mind 
perception. Mind perception might generally be defined as the psychological process of 
attributing, inferring, and interpreting others’ internal states that otherwise cannot be 
observed or accessed directly with one’s own senses, such as others’ thoughts, feelings, 
intentions, goals, desires, and consciousness (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Morewedge, Preston, 
& Wegner, 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Despite obvious difficulty in establishing 
proof that such states objectively exist, people’s tendency to perceive minds in the world 
is nonetheless pervasive and well-documented across social psychology, philosophy, and 
cognitive sciences (e.g., Bain, Vaes, Haslam, Kashima, & Guan, 2012; Dennett, 1996; 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Gray et al., 2007; Knobe & 
Prinz, 2008; Hassin, Aarts, & Ferguson, 2005; see Epley & Waytz, 2009, for a review). 
Indeed, minds seem to be all around. People perceive other minds spontaneously 
with little or no conscious effort (Hassin, Bargh, & Uleman, 2005), not only in other 
people but also in gods and spirits (Barrett, 2000), in cars and other cherished material 
possessions (Chandler & Schwarz, 2010), in large corporations like McDonalds or 
Walmart (Waytz & Young, 2011), in entitative groups (Morewedge, Chandler, Smith, 
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Schwarz, & Schooler, 2013), and even in inanimate objects like rocks and computers 
(Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010). Not surprisingly, then, the ability to perceive other 
minds is implicated in many important psychological processes, including perspective 
taking and empathy (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Hodges & Wegner, 1997), the 
development of “theory of mind” beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Gopnik, 2010), emotion 
detection (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), the dehumanization of outgroup others 
(Haslam, 2006), and moral reasoning (Ditto, 2006; Gray et al., 2012). 
 
Two Dimensions 
Insight into the nature of mind perception can be traced back long before 
contemporary research, rooted in classical Greek philosophy. In a famous treatise, 
Aristotle (350 BCE) defined mind as “the part of the soul by which it knows and 
understands” and argued that people’s possession of a mind imbued them with reason, 
which he claimed was alone sufficient for establishing more accurate self-knowledge and 
a better understanding of the thoughts and intentions of others (De Anima, 429a9-10). 
While modern scholars might not fully disagree with an Aristotelian view of the 
mind, they likely would find it somewhat incomplete. Recent empirical research in 
psychology suggests people perceive other minds not along a single dimension but along 
two: what might best be labeled as a dimension of agency and a dimension of experience 
(Gray et al., 2007). Agency is associated with rational thought and refers to people’s 
tendency to ascribe cognitive skills to others, such as their abilities to exert self-control, 
make plans, and act morally. Experience is associated with emotionality and refers to 
people’s tendency to ascribe affective sensitivities to others, such as their capacities to 
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feel pain and joy. Some targets are attributed high agency and low experience (e.g., 
gods), others high experience and low agency (e.g., pets), and still others high agency and 
high experience (e.g., adult humans) or low scores on both dimensions (e.g., cadavers). 
The agency/experience bifurcation maps closely onto distinctions that have been 
made in similar lines of research, particularly competence/warmth models of stereotyping 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), cold/warm models of person perception (Asch, 1946; 
Kelly, 1950), and dominance/nurturance models of personality judgments (Wiggins & 
Broughton, 1991). While Aristotle rightly emphasized the rational mind, his quote above 
seems to have missed an equivalent importance of the emotional mind, as highlighted by 
these varied literatures. People ascribe mental capacities to others along two dimensions, 
not one. Perhaps Descartes (1646) was more apt, who wrote in many years after Aristotle: 
"By the word ‘thought’ I understand everything we are conscious of as operating in us. 
And that is why not only understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the 
same thing as thinking" (Principles of Philosophy, 1-9). 
 
The Self as an Other 
 Until this point, mind perception has been discussed in terms of people’s tendency 
to attribute rationality and emotionality to other people, objects, and entities. However, 
because the assumed process is generally rooted in how people come to understand the 
world beyond the immediate senses, it seems reasonable to examine how people might 
perceive their own minds over time. Indeed, present moments are strikingly brief. As 
Kahneman and Riis (2005) poignantly note, “The experiencing self that lives each of 
these moments barely has time to exist” (p. 285). Thus, like the internal states of others, 
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our own lives before and after that vanishing window of experience lack any tangible 
qualities and thus are necessarily perceived and inferred (Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
Interestingly, prior research suggests that people often perceive their past and 
future selves from a third-person perspective, as if they were looking at someone else 
(Cohen & Gunz, 2002; Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Libby & Eibach, 2002; Lorenz & 
Neisser, 1985; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008; Pronin & 
Ross, 2006). Moreover, people seem to treat their past and future selves as if they were 
other people (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007), in that they choose smaller immediate 
rewards instead of larger rewards in the future (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 
2003), delay undesirable experiences now at the expense of doing them later (Ainslie & 
Haslam, 1992), and assign the same amounts of rewards and punishments to future selves 
as they assign to present others (Pronin et al., 2008). Even at a neuropsychological level, 
thinking about one’s own experiences across time (e.g., retrospection and prospection) 
and about others’ experiences across space (e.g., theory of mind, perspective taking) may 
activate a shared brain network, which may suggest that people process and represent 
their past and future selves as if those selves were literally other people (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2006; Ochsner et al., 2004; Pronin, 2008; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). 
Thus, people’s perceptions of their own mental states over time might closely 
parallel their perceptions of mental states in others. Given the predominant two-
dimensional model of perceiving others’ minds, one intriguing but yet untested question 
is how people might ascribe agency and experience to their own past and future selves, 
and if there are any systematic differences in these ascriptions as a function of tense. 
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Minds in Time 
How might people perceive the minds of their past and future selves? On the one 
hand, people may ascribe greater agency and greater experience to their future selves 
compared to their past or present selves. People tend to construct idealized versions of 
their futures (Higgins, 1987; Levinson, 1978), which can help us maintain self-esteem 
(Maslow, 1970), promote confidence (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000), and subdue 
negative moods (Taylor & Brown, 1988), as well as motivate present action and goal-
pursuit (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). The overarching view in 
this literature suggests that people tend to perceive the future as uniformly bigger, better, 
and “more” than yesterday or today. For example, most of us assume that our personal 
futures promise more opportunities, more purpose, more time, and more “refined” 
knowledge, opinions, and perspectives (Albert, 1977; Easterlin, 2001; Newby Clark & 
Ross, 2003; Ross & Newby-Clark, 1998; Wilson & Ross, 2003; Pavot, Diener, & Suh, 
1998; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). “The past is prologue,” a popular saying goes, “…the 
future is everything.” In line with this view, people might perceive their future selves as 
exhibiting more agency (e.g., rational thought) and more experience (e.g., emotions). 
On the other hand, the two-dimensional framework of mind perception affords a 
more nuanced interpretation of this literature, which turns out to focus almost exclusively 
on agency-related traits. People may believe that their futures will be bigger and better—
to the extent that they perceive increases in mastery (Taylor, 1983), willpower (Helzer & 
Gilovich, 2012), competency and efficacy (Bandura, 1982), goal achievement (Johnson, 
2009), autonomy (Ryff, 1991), and self-control (Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, & Walsh, 
2013; Williams & LaBoeuf, 2014), as well as corresponding decreases in susceptibility to 
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situational influences (Griffin, Dunning, & Ross, 1990), bad luck (Landau & Chisholm, 
1995), and immaturity (Robins, Noftle, Trzesniewski, & Roberts, 2005). Even one of the 
most influential existing frameworks, Wilson and Ross’s (2001) temporal self-appraisal 
theory, posits that people perceive their “positive traits” as constantly rising over time—
but nearly all the traits that reportedly rise are also specifically associated with agency 
(e.g., independence, self-reliance, seriousness about school, self-motivation). 
In terms of mind perception, past selves might indeed be ascribed less agency 
than the present and future selves more, consistent with these findings. But importantly, 
contrary to the generalized conclusion that the future is always “more” or “bigger,” there 
is reason to predict that ascriptions of experience may not follow the same pattern, and 
might sometimes even be greater for past selves than for future selves. 
 
Emotional Pasts and Rational Futures? 
Although attributions of agency and experience are traditionally thought to be 
orthogonal such that targets can be independently attributed varying levels of each, 
situations that allow for explicit comparisons between the two often result in a dynamic 
interplay of yin-and-yang, in which having a capacity for one can negate capacities for 
the other (Bloom, 2004; Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2012; Kervyn, 
Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009). Based on this dualistic property of mind perception, 
people “…have a tendency to view someone as capable of either agency or experience, 
either as someone capable of thinking or as someone capable of feeling” (Gray et al., 
2012, p. 2, emphasis in original). For example, the less a given target is described in 
experiential terms (e.g., a character who is born ‘genetically insensitive’ to pain), the 
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more agency people attribute to the target (e.g., the character is perceived as more 
responsible than others for a group crime: Gray & Wegner, 2009). This compensatory 
relationship is further demonstrated in the stereotyping literature, for instance, in people’s 
disinclination to attribute warmth to targets that have already been strongly stereotyped as 
competent, or vice versa (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Thus, based on the previously 
described research suggesting that attributions of agency may exhibit a strong linear 
pattern with past selves having much less and future selves having much more, it follows 
that ascriptions of experience could simply reflect the opposite: people may perceive non-
agentic (but experiential) past selves and agentic (but non-experiential) future selves. 
There are a number of possible reasons to predict this asymmetric split between 
“past = emotional” and “future = rational.” Four feasible possibilities are discussed here, 
each of which likely contribute to varying degrees across different judgment contexts. 
First, people’s temporal perceptions may sometimes simply be correct. It is well 
documented that people at younger life stages (e.g., adolescent youth) are prototypically 
more emotional and less rational than their older counterparts (e.g., middle aged adults; 
see Damon & Eisenberg, 1998; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; O’Brien, under review). 
Thus, to the extent that people evaluate past selves who are closer to youth and future 
selves who are closer to adulthood, the hypothesized asymmetry should be observed. I 
attempt to disentangle this issue by focusing mainly on short time frames, such that no 
actual “changes” should develop (e.g., rating one’s past and future self across 1 year). 
Nonetheless, given that these components are inherently inseparable (it is impossible to 
imagine one’s past or future self without simultaneously seeing oneself as younger or 
older), actual age is likely a driving mechanism across a number of real-world contexts. 
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Second and in a similar vein, people may overextend these beliefs about age and 
maturation for more “motivated” reasons. In other words, even if no actual development 
occurs across a given time frame, people may bring to bear prototypical notions of youth 
and adulthood onto past and future thinking. Indeed, going beyond actual age differences, 
people tend to believe that life moves towards something, that they learn and grow wiser 
over the course of their lives (Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; 
McAdams, 2006; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). In line with this view, people may desire to 
perceive their time as progressing along a positive and rational route, even at the cost of 
judgment accuracy (Aspinwall, 2006; Burger, 1985; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & 
Sripada, 2013). If one’s future seems brighter than one’s past—and given the pervasive 
belief that being rational is superior to being emotional (see Haidt, 2001, for a historical 
discussion)—people may perceive changes in rationality and emotionality accordingly. 
Third, these associations between “past = emotional” and “future = rational” may 
sometimes be less motivated and more rooted in core principles of cognitive accessibility, 
namely the focalistic tendency for people to attend to select bits of whatever information 
comes to mind (see Robinson & Clore, 2002; Schwarz, Kahneman, & Xu, 2009). On the 
one hand, no past is homogenous. All of us have met and not met goals, done things of 
which we are proud and ashamed, and been through highs and lows. Accordingly, we 
simply know more about the past than other points (Albert, 2000; Horwich, 1987), and so 
it is easier to remember than forecast events that are affectively-mixed (Newby-Clark & 
Ross, 2003), idiosyncratic (Kane, 2009), detailed (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004), and constrained by reality (Van Boven, Kane, & McGraw, 2009); after all, an 
actual variety of past experiences is easily accessible. In contrast, our tomorrows have yet 
 34 
to occur, and people tend to paint personal futures that are decontextualized (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2003), prototypic (Kane, Van Boven, & McGraw, 2012), controllable (Johnson 
& Sherman, 1990), and immune to outside influences (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). 
Thus, if people simply can recall the inevitable times when plans went awry and they 
were caught by emotional forces—but fail to predict the impact of these “hot” emotional 
states in the future—the hypothesized asymmetry in mind perception might be observed. 
Fourth, there may be phenomenological differences between the act of thinking 
about past versus future moments that could contribute to an asymmetry. For example, 
retrospection often triggers more distant mindsets than prospection (Caruso, Van Boven, 
Chin, & Ward, 2013), and evokes less arousal (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007). Many of 
these factors are accounted for in the current paper. In general, however, differences in 
the thought generation itself may further facilitate an asymmetric perception of mind. 
 
Overview 
Six studies tested a temporal redistribution hypothesis in the mind perception of 
self: the possibility that past selves are ascribed strong emotional experience but weak 
rational agency, whereas people’s ascriptions of emotions and rationality are reversed 
when they think about equidistant points in the future. Studies 1-3 sought to establish 
these patterns by explicitly assessing how people perceive their past and future selves 
across a wide range of measures and parameters. In turn, Study 4 tested whether these 
results generalize to any type of past/future thinking (e.g., imagining how a friend might 
change over time), or if they are specific to the self. The final studies went beyond direct 
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ratings to explore downstream consequences of temporal redistribution for how people 
actually think (Study 5) and behave (Study 6) in the present. 
Collectively, these studies were designed to highlight theoretical as well as 
practical insights into a number of psychological domains. Theoretically, they represent 
the first exploration of how the interpersonal agency/experience framework might extend 
to intrapersonal processes, mapping out the mind perception of past and future selves. In 
doing so, they not only help integrate many previous findings on intertemporal thinking 
(e.g., error versus accuracy in retrospection and prospection; identity and change over 
time; goal pursuit), but also suggest novel implications for how people’s concepts of past 
and future selves may be able to influence their emotional and cognitive experiences in 
real time—for better and worse. Finally, the multiple candidate mechanisms are revisited 
in the Chapter Discussion, which further serve to integrate a number of literatures. It is 
worth noting that, despite various drivers, they all predict the same overarching pattern: 
past selves may be perceived as emotional experiencers, future selves as rational agents. 
 
Study 1 
In the first 3 studies, participants were randomly assigned to recall the person they 
used to be or imagine the person they might become. A wide variety of methods were 
used across the studies, so to best test for converging patterns in how people perceive 
their past and future mental states. Study 1 avoided demand by asking participants to 
simply describe their past and future selves in a free writing session. In this way, people’s 
initial associations for past and future mental states could be assessed. Details for Study 1 
are provided below. As a complement to this experiment, Studies 2-3 then assessed fixed 
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ratings, and tested potential differences across distance by asking people to rate both 
distant selves (Study 2) and proximate selves (Study 3). Each study sought to employ 
different types of samples, methods, and dependent variables in order to establish the 
general patterns of how people perceive their own minds in time, above and beyond any 
particular phrasing or method. Below are the methods and results specifically for Study 1. 
Method. In individual sessions, 38 people (Mage = 33.19; 61% women) completed 
an online study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were told that they would 
complete an open-ended, free-writing session in a study ostensibly about how people 
describe themselves. They were asked to write about what traits, characteristics, and 
tendencies come to mind when they think about their “past self” and “future self.” The 
study design was within-subjects, such that all participants wrote about both selves one at 
a time in random order. They were asked to provide at least 5 full sentences for each 
description, and were not given any other specific instructions or details. 
After compiling the writing samples into a single data file, a group of naïve 
research assistants stripped away all demographic information and past/future phrasing. 
For example, one representative “future” participant originally wrote: “My future self 
will seek to control life events as much as possible, rather than allowing them to control 
her.” This phrase was rewritten as: “I seek to control life events as much as possible, 
rather than allowing them to control me.” In other words, descriptions were translated in 
ways that made them unidentifiable as to whether the original participants had written 
about their past or future selves, while maintaining all descriptive language. 
Then, these stripped descriptions were presented to a new sample from the same 
population (Amazon Turk: N = 52; Mage = 29.37, 31% women) who served as raters. In a 
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mixed-block design, each rater was presented with a random selection of 8 descriptions. 
After reading each description, raters were asked to think about the person who wrote it 
and to indicate how emotional he or she might be (1 = not at all of an emotional person, 
7 = very much an emotional person), how rational he or she might be (1 = not at all of a 
rational person, 7 = very much a rational person), and also to directly compare these 
dimensions (1 = this is mostly an emotional person, 7 = this is mostly a rational person). 
“Emotional” was defined as: “This person has a big capacity for feeling pleasure and 
pain, and has strong feelings; he/she is emotionally reactive and goes with his or her gut”. 
“Rational” was defined as: “This person has a big capacity for thought and planning, and 
has strong self-control; he/she is proactive and goes with his or her head”. It was also 
explicitly indicated that both definitions were meant to be equally desirable and 
important, in order to help reduce demand such that the raters automatically infer 
“emotional” to mean “bad” or “negative,” and “rational” to mean “good” or “positive.” 
Results. To simplify the analyses, t-tests were conducted such that the past/future 
variable of the original sample was used to examine differences in raters’ fully naïve 
perceptions, which were treated as independent observations. As predicted, descriptions 
of past selves seemed like they were depicting much more emotional people (M = 5.05, 
SD = 1.67) than descriptions of future selves (M = 4.12, SD = 1.64), t(414) = 5.73, p < 
.001. In contrast, descriptions of future selves seemed like they were depicting much 
more rational people (M = 5.30, SD = 1.42) than descriptions of past selves (M = 3.29, 
SD = 1.56), t(414) = -13.74, p < .001. Moreover, regarding the direct comparison item, 
past selves were rated as mostly emotional (M = 3.26, SD = 1.68) and future selves were 
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rated as mostly rational (M = 4.84, SD = 1.56), t(414) = -9.97, p < .001; ps < .001 when 
compared against the midpoint of the scale. 
These findings provide initial support for the hypothesis: people spontaneously 
and naturally described their past selves as emotional and their future selves as rational. 
These patterns emerged within a design that largely avoided demand characteristics, both 
for the writers who were not given any specific prompts or timeframes for how to 
describe their other selves, and for the outside raters who were completely blind to the 
past/future variable. The next study sought to extend these findings by using a different 
population, new methods and measures, control variables, and a specified timeframe. 
 
Study 2 
 In Study 2, participants were asked to rate their past or future selves on a variety 
of experience-related and agency-related dimensions. Rather than using open-ended 
essays as in the prior study, participants responded to specified, closed-ended scales. In 
this study, participants thought about distant selves from 10 years into the past or future. 
Method. In individual sessions, 80 people (Mage = 19.95; 59% women) were 
recruited across public campus areas to voluntarily complete a short (between-subjects) 
survey about how people think about themselves. Participants were randomly assigned to 
think about themselves “10 years ago” (past condition) or “10 years from now” (future 
condition). First, they indicated what age they would be and what year it would be at the 
given time point. Then, they rated their past or future selves on 6 experience-related 
domains and 6 agency-related domains, taken from Gray et al. (2012). They were 
specifically asked: “Compared to your present self as you are right now, how much is this 
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past [future] self capable of…” feeling pain, feeling pleasure, feeling desire, feeling fear, 
feeling rage, and feeling joy (i.e., 6 experience domains), as well as self-control, acting 
morally, planning, communication, memory, and thought (i.e., 6 agency domains), from 1 
(much less capable) to 5 (much more capable). The midpoint of the scale was labeled as 
3 (equally as capable). These domains were randomly presented in 1 of 2 random orders. 
Next, participants rated how far their past or future felt (1 = very near, 7 = very 
far), how difficult it was to generate images of their past or future (1 = very easy, 7 = very 
hard), and how much they liked their past or future self (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
These questions were included in order to control for potential differences between 
mental representations of the past and future beyond agency and experience. 
Results. Data were submitted to repeated measures MANOVA analyses. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Gray et al., 2012), the 6 agency items (α = .87) and 6 
experience items (α = .51) were collapsed into composite scores that represented people’s 
general sense of rationality versus emotionality, which were used as the within-subject 
factor. Past versus future condition served as the between-subjects factor. 
There was no main effect of the agency/experience variable (p = .37). There was a 
main effect of condition such that future selves were attributed more mind overall (M = 
3.31, SD = .28) than past selves were (M = 2.99, SD = .50), F(1, 78) = 12.00, p = .001. 
Importantly, this effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between condition and 
the agency/experience variable, F(1, 78) = 55.40, p < .001 (see Figure 3). As expected, 
past selves were attributed more experience (M = 3.29, SD = .46) than future selves were 
(M = 2.92, SD = .35), p < .001. In contrast, future selves were attributed more agency (M 
= 3.69, SD = .41) than past selves were (M = 2.68, SD = .92), p < .001. Comparing 
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experience and agency within each condition is also informative: past selves were 
attributed significantly more experience than agency (p < .001), whereas future selves 
were attributed significantly more agency than experience (p < .001). 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of the presence of rational-related qualities and emotional-related 
qualities (within-subjects) as perceived in past versus future selves (between-subjects), 




Finally, regarding the covariate questions, participants did not differ between how 
far away their past or future felt (p = .77) or how difficult it was to generate past or future 
images (p = .56). Conversely, participants did like their future selves (M = 5.70, SD = 
1.07) more than they liked their past selves (M = 5.10, SD = 1.71), p = .066. Importantly, 
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These findings further support the hypothesis: past selves were characterized by 
experience whereas equidistant future selves were strongly characterized by agency. 
Consistent with related research on how people think about themselves over time (e.g., 
see Hershfield, 2011), these effects were observed across distant 10-year periods. 
 
Study 3 
Study 3 sought to extend the results of Studies 1-2 in two important ways. First, 
participants were asked to think about themselves only 1 year into the distance and were 
recruited from a non-student population. This change serves as a check that the previous 
patterns indeed reflect differences in tense and not just a specific age gap between the 
perceived targets. Second, the next study employed original measures that were designed 
to more explicitly test the hypothesis. A practical reason for this change was to address 
the relatively low alpha of the experience scale from the last study (α = .51). This score is 
comparable to prior research—for instance, Gray et al. (2012) report experience alphas of 
.21, .53, and .56—but it may be useful to examine more diverse and explicit measures 
related to the hypothesis. In doing so, the next study can further check that the prior 
effects do not simply reflect a particular scale or phrasing. 
Method. In individual sessions, 80 people (Mage = 29.79; 55% women) completed 
an online study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Following a between-subjects design, 
participants were randomly assigned to think about the person they “used to be 1 year 
ago” (past condition) or the person they may be “in 1 year” (future condition). The 
dependent variables were broken into two parts (see Appendix A for details of all 
measures). In one part, participants read 6 experience scenarios and 6 agency scenarios, 
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designed to map onto the 12 mind domains that were used in Study 2. For each rating, 
participants estimated how intensely their past or future self would react (e.g., “You get 
stung by a bee and feel pain. How much pain would your past self have felt? [might your 
future self feel?]), on scales from 1 (not much) to 7 (a lot). In the other part, participants 
assessed their past or future selves on 5 global, explicit measures of emotionality and 5 
comparable measures of rationality (e.g., “In general, how emotional was your past self? 
[might your future self be?]), on scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). All measures were 
presented in 1 of 2 random orders. Finally, participants also responded to 2 manipulation 
checks (“In this study, did you think about your past or future?” and “How many years 
into the distance were you asked to think about?”). Only 2 participants wrongly answered 
any of these manipulation checks, and thus they were removed from analyses (N = 78). 
Results. Data were submitted to independent samples t-tests, with past versus 
future condition as the independent variable. 
For the scenario part of the study, the 6 experience scenarios (α = .71) and 6 
agency scenarios (α = .72) items were collapsed into composite scores, which acted as 
the dependent variables. Note that this experience alpha is substantially higher than was 
observed in the experience scale from Study 2. More important, as expected, participants 
perceived their past selves as reacting with significantly more experience (M = 4.96, SD 
= .91) than how they thought their future selves would react (M = 4.44, SD = .96), t(76) = 
2.39, p = .019. Conversely, participants perceived their future selves as exhibiting 
significantly more agency (M = 5.43, SD = .84) than how much they thought their past 
selves exhibited (M = 4.83, SD = .89), t(76) = -3.08, p = .003. 
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The same results were observed for participants’ global and explicit assessments. 
The 5 emotionality items (α = .75) and 5 rationality items (α = .80) were collapsed into 
composite scores. Again, this emotionality alpha is much higher than in Experiment 1a. 
Moreover, as expected, participants thought their past selves were significantly more 
emotional (M = 4.81, SD = 1.00) than their future selves (M = 4.21, SD = .91), t(76) = 
2.73, p = .008. Conversely, participants thought their future selves were significantly 
more rational (M = 5.58, SD = .86) than their past selves (M = 4.78, SD = .90), t(76) = -
3.96, p < .001. Finally, for all dependent variables, these effects remained when 
covarying question order, age, sex, and ethnicity (ps < .05). These findings extend the 
previous studies by showing that the same asymmetric patterns emerge when people are 
asked to rate proximate selves on more explicit measures. 
 
Study 4 
The first 3 studies helped establish the general effect: past selves are viewed in 
emotional terms whereas future selves are viewed in rational terms. The next study 
sought to examine whether these patterns reflect a more general past/future difference, or 
whether they indeed reflect something specific about the self. If temporal redistribution is 
completely driven by age and development, or by some phenomenological difference 
between thinking about the past versus future, then people should rate other targets in the 
same way as they rate themselves. In other words, people should also rate a friend’s 
future as more agentic and past as more emotional than the present. Conversely, if the 
patterns reflect something about one’s own development over time (e.g., beliefs about 
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personal progress and asymmetries in focalism, the primary posited mechanisms that 
were described in the introduction), then the patterns should only be observed for the self. 
Method. In individual sessions, 202 people (Mage = 32.43; 57% women) 
completed an online study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Following a between-subjects 
design, participants completed a survey about how people change over time. They were 
randomly assigned to compare “[themselves] about one year ago” to “[themselves] about 
one year from now” (self condition), or to type the initials of a good friend whom they 
knew much about and to compare “[this friend] about one year ago” to “[this friend] 
about one year from now” (other condition). Then, in random order, participants were 
asked to rate the target’s change in “emotionality” and “rationality” across the given time 
period. Definitions were provided for each term and were described in a similar way to 
Study 1: emotionality was defined as big capacities for pleasure and pain and the ability 
to express strong feelings, whereas rationality was defined as big capacities for thought 
and planning and the ability to exert strong self-control. Again, both dimensions were 
described as being equally desirable to help prevent demand. For each, participants were 
given 3 answers from which to pick the most accurate: whether the target’s emotionality 
and rationality will increase, decrease, or stay the same over the given period of time. 
Results. Given that all dependent measures were comprised of forced-choice 
items within a mixed-model design, independent multinomial logistic regressions were 
conducted for emotionality and rationality, split by target. In other words, the percent 
chosen of each choice (increase, decrease, or stay the same) was compared within each 
dimension (emotionality or rationality), between targets (self or friend: see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Percentage of participants in each condition who chose either “decreasing,” 
“stay the same,” or “increasing” regarding the change in emotionality and rationality 
across a 2-year period within themselves or within a friend. As can be seen, temporal 




In terms of emotionality, there was the expected overall effect of target in line 
with the hypothesis, β = 1.32, p < .001, Wald = 16.22. When thinking about changes in 
emotions over time, most people indicated that their own emotionality will decrease 
(45.1%)—significantly more than the percentage of people who chose that their 
emotionality will increase (27.5%) or stay the same (27.5%), β = -.50, p = .038,         
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chose that their friend’s emotionality will decrease (18.0%: β = -1.20, p < .001, Wald = 
20.07) or increase (22.0%: β = -1.00, p < .001, Wald = 16.20). 
Accordingly, the opposite patterns emerged for rationality. Again, there was the 
expected overall effect of target, β = 1.15, p < .001, Wald = 15.28. When thinking about 
changes in rationality over time, most people indicated that their own rationality will 
increase (59.8%)—far more than the percentage of people who chose that their rationality 
will decrease (9.8%: β = -1.81, p < .001, Wald = 28.09) or stay the same (30.4%: β =        
-.0.68, p = .002, Wald = 9.42). In contrast, most people indicated that their friend’s 
rationality will stay the same (54.0%)—far more than the percentage of people who chose 
that their friend’s rationality will increase (32.0%: β = -0.52, p = .019, Wald = 5.50) or 
decrease (14.0%: B = -1.35, p < .001, Wald = 20.26). In other words, temporal 
redistribution appears to only occur when thinking about the self. 
Finally, given that judgments of emotions and rationality were made within 
subjects, it is also informative to examine how many people chose the hypothesized 
combination (i.e., decreasing emotionality plus increasing rationality) for themselves 
versus their friends. A one-sample binomial t-test revealed that, among all participants 
who reported this combination, the vast majority were in the “self” condition (84.6%) 
rather than in the “other” condition (15.4%), t(38) = -4.16, p < .001. Moreover, in terms 
of raw numbers via multinomial regressions, the relative majority of “self” participants 
(32.4%) reported the combination—significantly more often than any other possible 
combination of answers (all βs < -.79, all ps < .011). In contrast, only 6% of “other” 
participants reported the combination, which was not significantly more often than any 
other possibility—and, in fact, much less often than a combination of “stay the same”,     
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β = 1.64, p <. 001. In other words, most “self” participants reported that their past selves 
were more emotional and their future selves will be more rational, whereas most “other” 
participants reported that their friends’ emotionality and rationality will stay the same. 
These findings help shed more nuanced light on the asymmetric patterns that were 
observed in the first 3 studies. “Past = emotional” and “future = rational” associations 
were much more pronounced when people compared their own change across a two-year 
period than when they compared a friend’s change across the same points in time. In fact, 
when thinking about a friend, most people reported that capacities for emotionality and 
rationality will essentially remain unchanged. Thus, temporal redistribution cannot 
merely reflect some incidental effect of target age or general difference between past and 
future thinking, because these factors remain constant when thinking about a friend. 
The final studies mark a departure from Studies 1-4 in the types of methods and 
measures that were employed. Specifically, Experiments 5-6 went beyond people’s 
explicit reports of their past and future mental capacities. Instead, these studies explored 
implications for changing real-time judgments (Experiment 3) and behaviors (Experiment 
4) in the present, across a variety of parameters and outcomes. 
Study 5 explored a downstream consequence with important interpersonal costs: 
how people might differentially explain away their own bad actions or behaviors that 
they remember committing in the past versus imagine committing in the future. In related 
research, Caruso (2010) measured people’s perceptions of fairness after manipulating 
external decisions over time (e.g., manipulating whether a fictional target had already 
done something unethical versus whether they were contemplating doing it: Caruso, 
2010). The next study, however, specifically explored the role of perceived agency in 
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one’s own actual behaviors. Given the intimate connection between agentic involvement 
and perceptions of morality (see Gray et al., 2012), Study 5 sought to explore the role of 
temporal redistribution in driving differences in moral judgment. 
 
Study 5 
If past selves have more experience and future selves have more agency, then 
people might make different attributions for the same event that they imagine doing in the 
past versus in the future. Specifically, people may be more likely to “explain away” their 
bad behaviors from the past than bad behaviors from the future if they perceive their past 
selves as possessing relatively weak personal agency in bringing those behaviors about. 
In other words, people may feel less responsible for past bad acts than future bad acts. 
Ironically, an action that has already happened—thus involving actual responsibility—
may seem less offensive than a future behavior that has yet to occur, precisely because 
people may differentially perceive the mental capacities of the “self” who commits it. 
Study 5 explored this possibility. People were asked to think about bad behavior 
that they either had actually committed during the previous year, or that they may commit 
during the upcoming next year. If past selves are perceived as possessing weaker agentic 
capacities than future selves, then people should be inclined to claim less responsibility 
for past bad behavior than similar bad behavior at an equidistant future. 
Method. In individual sessions, 68 people (Mage = 31.78; 40% women) completed 
an online study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Following a between-subjects design, 
participants were randomly assigned to remember a bad behavior that they actually 
committed last year (past condition) or imagine a bad behavior that they could commit 
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next year (future condition). Bad behavior was defined as “an incident in which you do 
something bad, such as lying, cheating, stealing, or being mean to someone else.” To help 
encourage honesty, participants were explicitly asked to not identify the behavior. 
Next, participants rated their agreement with the following 6 statements on a 
sliding scale from 0 (disagree completely) to 100 (agree completely): how much this 
behavior is excusable and understandable, and how bad, guilty, regretful, and shameful 
this behavior makes them feel. These questions served as the measure of responsibility. 
Then, participants also rated how detailed their generated behavior seemed (1 = not at all, 
7 = very) in order to help control for potential differences beyond responsibility. 
After this main part of the study, participants were asked to rate their past or 
future mental capacities in terms of agency and experience, as a means of replicating the 
temporal redistribution patterns and also to serve as a possible mediator. Participants in 
the past condition rated their agreement with the following two statements: “My past self 
from last year is the type of person who is a strong ‘agent’: proactive and rational” and 
“My past self from last year is the type of person who is a strong ‘experiencer’: reactive 
and emotional” (each from 0 = disagree completely, 100 = agree completely). A 
difference score was calculated by subtracting rational from emotional, in order to obtain 
an overall “mind” rating for past selves. The same items and procedures were used to rate 
future selves from next year among participants in the future condition. 
Results. A composite index of responsibility was created for the dependent 
variable (reverse-coded excusable, reverse-coded understandable, feel bad, feel guilty, 
feel regretful, and feel shameful: α = .81). Data were then submitted to independent 
samples t-tests, with past versus future condition as the independent variable. 
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As predicted, participants claimed significantly less responsibility for past bad 
behavior (M = 63.28, SD = 15.89) than future bad behavior (M = 73.01, SD = 19.24), 
t(66) = -2.28, p = .026. Moreover, there was no difference between the level of detail for 
thinking about the past (M = 5.22, SD = 1.56) versus future (M = 5.33, SD = 1.04), t(66) 
= -.36, p = .72, and the effect of the past/future variable on responsibility remained when 
entering detail as a covariate in ANCOVA (ps < .05). 
Regarding the proposed mediator, the asymmetric patterns were replicated from 
previous studies: mental capacities were rated as much more rational when participants 
thought about their future minds (M = 33.03, SD = 32.36) than when thinking about their 
past minds (M = -.34, SD = 36.43), t(66) = -4.00, p < .001. In turn, and in line with the 
theoretical framework, mind perception fully mediated the effect of the past/future 
variable on how much responsibility people claimed (Hayes, 2012: 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval = [.41 to 10.42], which excludes the value 0; see also Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Multiple regression mediation model (Baron & Kenny, 1986) showing the 
influence of temporal condition (past or future) on claimed responsibility, as influenced 
by perceptions of mind. The ps in parentheses show the strength of the path between two 






These results highlight an important downstream consequence of temporal 
redistribution. Because people perceive their past selves as possessing relatively less 
agency than in the present and future, they are less likely to claim responsibility their own 
immoral behaviors that occur in the past than at other time points. The mediation analysis 
provides direct evidence suggesting that differences in how responsible participants feel 
about their own bad behaviors over time are driven by the perceived mental capacities 
associated with the type of “self” who is thought to commit them. On the other hand—
and on a more comforting note—people feel quite responsible for their bad behaviors yet 
to come, because future selves seemingly possess more agency in bringing them about. 
 
Study 6 
The final experiment tested another consequence of people’s associations for 
“emotional pasts” and “rational futures,” extending beyond judgments of past and future 
actions to how they might potentially influence people’s choices and preferences in the 
present. If past selves are perceived as emotional experiencers, then inducing people to 
feel connected to their pasts may lead them to make more emotional choices and prefer 
feeling-related content. By the same logic, inducing people to feel connected to their 
futures should lead them to make more rational choices and prefer thinking-related 
content. Study 6 tested these possibilities. In doing so, it sought to use temporal 
redistribution as a novel framework for understanding differences in actual choice. 
Method. In individual sessions, 190 undergraduates (Mage = 19.47; 50.5% 
women) completed a laboratory study in exchange for course credit. Following a 
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between-subjects design, participants completed a study ostensibly about role playing and 
imagination. They were randomly assigned to past, future, or present (control) 
conditions. To start the study, “past” participants were told to think about the type of 
person they were from about 1 year ago, and “future” participants were told to think 
about the type of person they will be about 1 year from now. They were asked to reflect 
on this other self and spend a minute forming a mental image of this person. Importantly, 
participants were not given any specific details or boundaries in order to prevent demand 
(e.g., “reflect on how you used to feel or think”); they were primed only with their freely 
generated images of their past or future self. 
Next, participants were asked to “role play” as this past or future self and perform 
subsequent tasks as if this other self had come into the lab. This role playing design was 
adapted directly from prior work on how people think about themselves over time (e.g., 
O’Brien, under review; Pronin & Ross, 2006). Because participants are never instructed 
how to exactly act or what to specifically imagine in their other selves, their behavioral 
responses can thus serve as a discreet proxy for their perceptions of mind over time. 
“Present” participants skipped right to the movie selection measure (described below). 
Then, participants moved to the actual role playing task. They were shown a list 
of movies and were asked to choose which ones they prefer. Materials were adapted from 
prior work on preferences for “should” versus “want” entertainment content (Williams & 
LeBoeuf, 2013). The list was divided between 10 prototypical “thinking” movies that had 
been released on DVD during the preceding few years, and 10 similar “feeling” movies. 
“Thinking” movies were defined as follows: “These types of movies are typically serious, 
thoughtful, and intellectual, like documentaries, art films, and foreign films. They may 
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not be a rollicking good time, but they provide enrichment and intellectual stimulation. In 
short: people tend to watch these movies for more rational reasons.” Examples included 
The Reader, Milk, and Doubt. Conversely, “feeling” movies were defined as follows: 
“These types of movies are typically fun, funny, or frivolous, like a comedy, romance, or 
action flick. They are very enjoyable to watch in the moment, but are somewhat 
forgettable after the fact. In short: people tend to watch these movies for more emotional 
reasons.” Examples included Star Trek, The Hangover, and Duplicity. A picture of the 
cover art and a brief plot description were provided for each movie. Participants were 
explicitly told that both categories of movies should be viewed as equally valuable and 
desirable, but were simply meant for different types of occasions. 
Participants were then asked, “Assuming you had enough free time right now, 
which type of movie would you choose?”, and chose either the “thinking” or “feeling” 
category. It was also made clear that their choice was not limited to the movies indicated 
on the list, and that the list was simply meant to provide possible examples. Afterwards, 
“past” and “future” participants rated how difficult it was to role play as their other self   
(1 = not at all, 7 = very), how difficult it was to imagine their other self (1 = not at all, 7 
= very), and how far away their other self feels from the current moment (1 = not very 
far, 7 = very far). These measures served to help account for potentially relevant 
differences caused by the manipulation beyond agency and experience. 
Results. Data were submitted to binary logistic regression analyses, with 
condition as the predictor variable (“past,” “present,” or “future”) and movie choice 
(“thinking” or “feeling”) as the dependent variable. In terms of the “present” control 
group, participants generally preferred “feeling” movies to “thinking” movies (68.85%). 
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However, as expected, connecting to one’s future self significantly diminished this 
preference (46.88%), whereas connecting to one’s past self significantly enhanced it 
(83.08%), β = -.86, p < .001, Wald = 17.66. Put another way, connecting to one’s future 
self led participants to choose “thinking” movies more often than they typically would, 
whereas connecting to one’s past self led to a stronger preference for “feeling” movies. 
Finally, regarding the covariate and demographic questions, “past” and “future” 
participants did not differ between how difficult it was to role play as their other selves (p 
= .83), how difficult it was to imagine their other selves (p = .47), or how far away their 
other selves felt (p = .28). And importantly, the effect of time on movie choice remained 
significant when controlling for all of these variables, β = -.98, p < .001, Wald = 18.18. 
These results highlight novel implications for temporal redistribution to change 
real-time preferences and choices in the present. Because past selves are perceived as 
emotional experiencers, people who are induced to connect to their past selves are more 
likely to choose emotional, feeling-based content; conversely, connecting to agentic 
future selves makes people more likely to choose rational, thinking-based content. 
 
Chapter Discussion 
Many people spend many moments mentally travelling through time, journeying 
beyond immediate experience to retrace what once was and to entertain what might be 
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003; Tulving, 2002). Six experiments 
revealed that the type of person awaiting our arrival depends on which direction we have 
embarked. When thinking about their pasts, people see someone who is more capable of 
emotionality but less capable of rational thought. But when thinking about an equidistant 
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future, people see someone who is more capable of thinking rationally but less sensitive 
to emotions. This temporal asymmetry reflects a redistribution of mental capacities for 
experience (emotional reactivity, body sensitivity) versus agency (cognition, rationality). 
Participants spontaneously described their past selves in emotional terms and future 
selves in rational terms (Study 1). Further, they explicitly ascribed experiential qualities 
to past selves but agentic qualities to future selves—at both distant (Study 2) and 
proximate (Study 3) points. These associations were specific to imagining one’s own 
change over time (Study 4), and had important consequences for how people construe 
their own behaviors (Study 5) and for what they actually choose (Study 6) in the present. 
Multiple Mechanisms. As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, there are a 
number of likely pathways that could lead people to perceive their past selves as 
emotional and their future selves as rational. Collectively, however, the current studies 
help rule out some of these possibilities and also point to a candidate explanation. 
One the one hand, people’s temporal perceptions may simply be correct, to the 
extent that they look back to the past at an objectively more emotional life stage (e.g., 
adolescence) and to a more cognitive-focused life stage in the future (e.g., working 
adulthood: for a detailed developmental review see Damon & Eisenberg, 1998). This 
account, however, does not fit the current studies, which find the hypothesized patterns 
among participants of older age groups and using short time frames (e.g., people in their 
mid 30’s who thought about only 1 or 2 years across time). Here, it seems unlikely that 
participants were thinking about past and future selves who were significantly more or 
less mature or among a qualitatively different age bracket than in the present. 
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Another possible explanation might reflect general phenomenological differences 
between the act of thinking about past versus future moments, or perhaps broader beliefs 
about general change in the world (see Van Boven et al., 2009 for a review). Again, 
however, many of the current studies controlled for relevant differences (e.g., perceived 
temporal distance from the present; difficulty in generating past versus future images) 
and still found significant effects. More telling is Experiment 2, which showed that 
temporal redistribution does not occur when thinking about a friend over time. This 
finding cannot be accounted for by the above explanation, given that tense was held 
constant and differences were still observed within past and within future conditions. 
Thus, the candidate mechanism proposed in the current paper draws a bridge 
between the literatures on perceptions of progress and focalism. It is well-established that 
people believe their lives move towards something, that they learn and grow wiser over 
the course of their development regardless of their actual life stage (e.g., Heckhausen & 
Krueger, 1993; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989; McAdams, 2006; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). 
In short, people tend to optimistically believe that their futures will be more positive and 
promising than their pasts (see Burger, 1985). In turn, one reason for this optimism may 
be due to basic asymmetries in focalism: both ups and downs from the actual past are 
accessible and can be brought to mind, whereas thoughts of the hypothetical future are 
decontextualized and largely focus on successful outcomes (Johnson & Sherman, 1990; 
Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
Thus, if people simply can recall the inevitable times when plans went awry and they 
were caught by emotional forces—but fail to predict the impact of these “hot” emotional 
states in the future—the hypothesized asymmetry in mind perception should be observed. 
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Taken together, the current studies suggest that traditional conceptualizations of 
the future as uniformly bigger, better, or “more” may need to be amended to consider not 
just a single dimension but two. Consistent with prior work on perceptions of increasing 
competency, control, willpower, and motivation (Helzer & Gilovich, 2012; Ryff, 1991; 
Taylor, 1983; Williams & LaBoeuf, 2014; Wilson & Ross, 2001), participants perceived 
their future selves as stronger agents than their present selves, and past selves as weaker. 
Going beyond prior work, however, participants did not rate their future selves as greater 
experiencers. Rather, future selves were ascribed less experience than their past or 
present selves, and past selves were perceived as most emotional of all. This distinction, 
although prominent in research on perceptions of others (Asch, 1946; Fiske et al., 2002; 
Gray et al., 2007; Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979; Wiggins & Broughton, 1991), 
has thus far been lost in describing how people think about themselves. As a result, prior 
work has largely lumped agency-specific characteristics into a single category of “self,” 
concluding that the future is uniformly “increasing” from the past. These results reveal 
that people do not uniformly perceive the future as “more” but specifically more agentic, 
with correspondingly weaker emotional experience. Perceptions of the past and future are 
not more or less in general but sensitive to perceived capacities of past and future minds. 
Theoretical Insights. The perceived distinction between emotional pasts and 
rational futures provides an overarching structure from which to understand why people 
make overly optimistic plans (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), hyperbolically discount future rewards (Frederick et al., 2003), predict that they 
will have unrealistically positive life outcomes (Weinstein, 1980), imagine behaving 
more morally than they actually would behave (Epley & Dunning, 2000), and a host of 
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related forecasting errors (for reviews see Johnson & Sherman, 1990; Ross & Buehler, 
2004; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). If future selves are seen as highly agentic and not very 
emotionally reactive, these “errors” in predicting future feelings, thoughts, and behaviors 
may only be wrong to the extent that we think the person doing the feeling, thinking, and 
behaving possesses a different type of mind than the one we have today; there is an 
“error” in who we think we will be, not how we think that person might respond. Indeed, 
the notoriously weak correlation in the social sciences between attitudes (e.g., intending 
to vote) and behavior (e.g., actually voting; see Wicker, 1969) seems reasonable if people 
believe their highly agentic future selves will follow through with the plans, insensitive to 
the inevitable emotional pulls that come along the way. Someone who is independent and 
hard-to-sway might very well meet deadlines, finish plans, react less intensely to small 
rewards, and wait for $500 in 12 months in lieu of $450 in 11 months—precisely the type 
of person who we imagine being in prospect, but not necessarily who we are in real time. 
On a more specific note, these findings help explain the phenomenon of future 
anhedonia, in which people predict that identical hedonic states will be less satisfying in 
the future than in the present (Kassam, Gilbert, Boston, & Wilson, 2008). This insight 
may also account for why people so often struggle to empathize with their future selves 
(Hershfield, 2011); it might be difficult to feel empathy for someone who we think has 
relatively weak emotional capacities. Furthermore, it may account for why people can 
accurately recall past reactions and yet still wildly mispredict their reactions in the future 
(Novemsky & Ratner, 2003; Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001)—like comparing apples 
and oranges, past selves are perceived as strong experiencers who may not seem like an 
appropriate proxy to judge future agents. Similarly, Experiment 3 suggests people may be 
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inclined to explain away bad behaviors in terms of a past capacity for affective reactivity, 
which not only has obvious interpersonal costs (e.g., justifying past transgressions) but 
may blind them to past decisions they may prefer to not repeat. For example, a struggling 
dieter could have failed an exercise plan because of a poor trainer or book, but attribute 
the failure to their past emotional mind and return to the same unhelpful advice. Clearly, 
any benefits of perceiving tomorrow as more agentic seem limited once people reach the 
future and find themselves no better off than how they were before. 
More generally, these results help enrich the literature on construal level theory of 
temporal distance (Liberman et al., 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010), which posits that the 
same event is represented in different ways depending on if it feels close or far from now. 
Because people infer distinct mental capacities in themselves at equidistant points in 
time, these results complement a growing body of work highlighting phenomenological 
asymmetries between mental representations of the past and future at a constant distance 
(Burns, Caruso, & Bartels, 2011; Caruso, 2010; Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008; Van 
Boven & Ashworth 2007). For example, Burns et al. (2011) showed that people perceive 
others’ behavior as more intentional when they imagine it in the future versus the past, 
which maps closely onto an “agentic” perspective. 
Perhaps most interestingly, Study 6 suggests that goal-directed choices and 
behavior may be facilitated by employing a fit between one’s goal and one’s current 
temporal orientation. Experiential goals (e.g., to more fully enjoy an upcoming vacation, 
meal, date, party, or leisure activity) might be facilitated by encouraging a sense of 
connection between one’s present and past (“How would my past self have reacted?”). 
Agentic goals (e.g., to fight pain, stick with a plan, resist temptation, act morally) might 
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be facilitated by encouraging a sense of connection between one’s present and future 
(“How might my future self react?”). Given the prevalence of self-regulatory failures and 
impediments to goal pursuit (e.g., see Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Fishbach & 
Ferguson, 2007), examining the connection between how people perceive their pasts and 
futures in relation to the present may afford novel and surprisingly simple solutions. 
Future Directions. These results provide many interesting avenues for follow-up 
research. From an individual difference perspective, naturally past-oriented people could 
be more in touch with their emotions and naturally future-oriented people could be more 
in touch with their thoughts (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Also, there may be important 
boundary conditions to the general patterns, such as intense negative mood (i.e., people 
who are depressed may not perceive their future selves as highly agentic: Alloy & 
Ahrens, 1987) or if people have reason to believe they have changed over time (Ross, 
1989). Other work might continue to explore problematic implications. For example, a 
student who strongly believes in an agentic tomorrow might actually be more inclined to 
procrastinate and delay study efforts today, assuming that his or her future self will be 
better suited to handle the work. 
Conceptually, future studies might tease apart more exact parameters of the effect. 
One interesting route could more closely examine exactly what types of emotions and 
cognitions do or do not follow the pattern. More “proactive” emotions, for example—like 
feeling determined or interested—may be perceived as ever-increasing, particularly if the 
phenomenon is capturing people’s perceptions of declining reactivity or passivity. On a 
similar note, there could be a variety of interesting cultural differences in temporal 
redistribution, to the extent that people’s valuation of agentic and experiential traits varies 
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beyond relatively homogenous Western samples. Intriguingly, one might be able to flip 
the patterns simply be manipulating people to value their emotions more highly (e.g., by 
first reading an alleged science article about the value of emotions in decision making). 
Summary. Results of 6 studies have provided converging evidence for a robust 
temporal asymmetry in how people perceive changes in their internal mental states: past 
selves are viewed as emotional experiencers, whereas future selves are viewed as rational 
agents, reflecting people’s optimism about growing more in control and wiser over time. 
This observation thus adds to a rich literature on how people think about the minds of 
others, which so far has focused on mind perception across space but not time (Epley & 
Waytz, 2009). Perceiving minds has been established as a pervasive component of many 
interpersonal processes—and apparently the intrapersonal process of mental time travel 
is no exception. When looking back to the past we see a person who is generally more 
emotional and less rational, but waiting in the future is someone generally more rational 
and less emotional. This asymmetry has important implications for how people make 





If the present “barely has time to exist” (Kahneman & Riis, 2005, p. 285), then all 
that remains of a life are mere perceptions of moments gone by and of those still to pass. 
This inescapable component of mental and social life has comprised the broad scope of 
my dissertation. I sought to explore the role of tense in everyday judgment and decision 
making, and examine the temporal asymmetries that can emerge in how people process 
an otherwise similar experience. Indeed, tense matters: 1 year into the past is not the 
same as 1 year into the future, even if their level of abstraction is comparable (in contrast 
to other popular accounts of construal; see Trope & Liberman, 2010). More specifically, 
my dissertation highlighted asymmetries in valence: people’s pervasive and deep-rooted 
beliefs that their tomorrows will be more positive than their yesterdays or their todays. 
The 2 papers presented here provide complementary evidence for how such 
optimistic perceptions persist and come to be maintained and reinforced, even when 
people face information that may suggest otherwise. At an “external” level—how people 
think about the possibility of life events themselves—I demonstrated that people simply 
discount cues that forewarn of negative events in their futures (i.e., fluency for imagining 
unhappy future experiences), stubbornly believing those events will not actually occur 
(Chapter II). Similarly, at an “internal” level—how people think about changes in their 
own internal traits and abilities—I demonstrated that people perceive their future selves
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as possessing superior mental capacities (e.g., self-control and rational thought) as 
compared to their past and present selves (Chapter III); hence, even if bad events were to 
happen, people believe that their future selves will be better equipped to handle them.  
Rather than trying to “prove” that optimism is uniformly advantageous (e.g., in that it 
provides health benefits, boosts mood, and facilitates goal pursuit: Seligman, 2008) or 
uniformly detrimental (e.g., in that it biases decision making and puts people in overly 
risky situations: Sharot, 2012), these findings add to the dense and diverse literature on 
optimism by pointing to when positive perceptions of the future should help versus hurt. 
The “discounting fluency” paper suggests that optimism should pose particular 
problems to the extent that people focus on future events that are both negative and 
objectively likely to occur, given that people may disregard this objective information 
and put themselves at risk of being unprepared for the unpleasant. By the same logic, 
however, optimism should help to the extent that people focus on future events that are 
negative and unlikely (because they will rightly not be bothered), or any positive events. 
One real “problem” of optimism, then, may rest on this valence-specific split: that the 
prospect of negative events has less aversive impact than the boosts provided by positive 
events. Objective likelihood of future events hence may represent a critical moderator of 
when optimism should serve as an advantage or as a disadvantage. The “emotional pasts 
and rational futures” paper takes this implication a step further: after likely negative 
events inevitably occur, people may not learn from their past mistakes of (not) preparing 
because they overestimate their future ability to cope. Getting people to better appreciate 
the impact of bad life experiences (rather than taming their overly positive perceptions) 
may thus represent a fruitful way to tighten the focus of the existing optimism literature. 
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Finally, going beyond optimism per se, one of my overarching interests in 
choosing this dissertation topic was to highlight the role of time as a central social 
psychological construct. In the opening quote, James urged us to think about temporal 
life dualistically with regards to how people divide their pasts from their futures, in what 
would ultimately become his broader theory of the “specious present” (1890). In the 
many years since, empirical studies have more or less followed this train of thought. 
Lewin (1943) helped formalize James’ perspective with his “life-space” framework, 
which emphasized the primacy of the present in dynamically shaping how people 
perceive distant experiences. And more contemporary work (including this dissertation) 
has continued to focus on time in terms of the past versus present versus future, such as 
research into affective forecasting (e.g., Gilbert & Wilson, 2007), temporal construal 
(e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003), and autobiographical recall (e.g., Wilson & Ross, 2001). 
In addition to the various nuances that have been uncovered about past and future 
thinking, there remain many ways to define time as a variable of interest. For example, 
awareness of “when” an event occurs—such as how we come to understand “beginnings” 
and “endings”—may play an important role in evaluation and liking; the “thought speed” 
in processing our experiences could impact broader inferences, behaviors, and wellbeing; 
feeling connected to certain life stages or eras might predict differences in personality 
and preferences; and our sense of change may be intimately tied to everyday goal pursuit. 
A number of studies have begun to address these and other questions, building a 
case for time as a rich construct of social psychological inquiry deserving of its own book 
chapters, seminars, conference themes, and beyond. I hope my dissertation not only sheds 




A. All dependent measures in Chapter III, Study 3. All participants completed all 
measures, but were randomly assigned to rate either their past or future self 1 year into 
the distance. For the scenarios, participants were asked to estimate how intensely their 
past or future self would respond on scales from 1 (not much) to 7 (a lot). For the global 
assessments, each item began with the phrase “In general…”, and participants responded 




1) You get stung by a bee and feel pain. 
2) You take a nap and feel pleasure. 
3) You crave your favorite food and feel desire. 
4) You scream at the sight of a bug and feel fear. 
5) You get into a fight with a friend and feel rage. 
6) You turn on your favorite movie and feel joy. 
 
Agency Scenarios 
1) You are tempted by a guilty pleasure but need to exhibit self-control. 
2) You are in a dilemma and need to act morally. 
3) You need to make careful and detailed plans ahead of time. 
4) You need to give a public speech and communicate your words powerfully. 
5) You need to rely on your memory. 
6) You need to organize your thoughts clearly and think independently. 
 
Global Assessments of Emotions 
1) How emotional was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
2) How reactive was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
3) How sensitive was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
4) How easily moved was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
5) How swayable was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
 
Global Assessments of Rationality 
1) How rational was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
2) How proactive was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
3) How strong-minded was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
4) How in-charge was your past self? [might your future self be?] 
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